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Abstract - The article in the first instance aims to present the pattern of regional inequality in 
Italy over the long run, through benchmark years, for what regards per capita value added, but 
also human capital (education) and social capital. Secondly, the Italian case is discussed in view 
of the neoclassical approach, which incorporates human and social capital as conditioning 
variables in a long term production function, through both cross-section and dynamic panel 
regressions. The results are compared with those from descriptive statistics, concluding that the 
neoclassical modelling can hardly add something more to a mere correlation evidence. As a 
consequence, this paper explores the viability of alternative approaches, which should properly 
consider historical changes in technology, in institutions and in the production function, and 
briefly reviews the research to come in order to implement a dynamic model. 
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…que defiendan la casualidad como principio  
frente a la causalidad  de los azares.  
 





The pattern and the determinants of regional inequality in Italy have been debated since the late 
nineteenth century, and still are they the subject of an ever-growing literature with a remarkable in-
ternational echo, not least for the very persistence of the North-South divide. At the present, how-
ever, results are still far from conclusive or convincing, in particular for what regards regional ine-
quality over the long run: not only because historical estimates have been highly uncertain until a 
few years ago, and maybe still are they in part, but also because the prevailing neoclassical ap-
proach in economics and growth econometrics, being essentially static, is probably inadequate to 
account for historical change. This paper does not aim to resolve the big debate on Italy’s regional 
inequality; more modestly, it intends to present some essential facts (in the form of estimates) and 
to clear up the path for a more profitable research about causal relations.    
The article reviews the pattern of regional inequality in Italy since the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury until our days, in the light of the most recent value added estimates as well as of data on human 
capital and social capital, in benchmark years. Its prime goal is to discuss whether and how, at the 
present stage of research, the available data can be employed in the ‘conventional’ econometric 
models in order to explain the historical pattern of Italy’s regional inequality over the long run; in-
deed they can, provided we accept those models and their assumptions, yet both the assumptions 
and the following results appear to be far from satisfactory. As a consequence, we address the ques-
tion whether neoclassical models are useful at all to account for what seems to be the most distinc-
tive feature of Italian economic development, at least in comparison with other western European 
countries: its persistent historical dualism, or better the fact that regional convergence began but 
came to a halt during the last decades. On this, the answer is mainly negative, and this paper ends 
up with some notes on how the statistical coverage should be extended and dynamic models imple-
mented. 
Section §2 critically reviews the neoclassical approach about international and inter-regional 
convergence, then section §3 briefly presents the estimates of regional value added and outlines the 
long run pattern of regional inequality in Italy. Sections §4 and §5 are devoted to presenting and   2 
testing two fundamental independent variables in growth models: human capital and social capital 
respectively; descriptive statistics and neoclassical growth regressions are compared, concluding 
that the latter do not add anything significant to the former. At last, section §6 explores the possibil-
ity of a dynamic time series approach, and outlines a research agenda to be undertaken in order to 
produce the required historical estimates. This dynamic approach, as well as descriptive statistics 




2. Convergence or divergence? An outline of the models and the worldwide debate 
 
Neoclassical models of convergence are based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capi-
tal or, in other terms, of the downward sloping of the savings curve. In a closed economy, where 
savings are equal to gross investments, according to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) the growth rate 
of the capital stock would be:  
 
γk = s*Aƒ(k)/k – (δ + n)                                                                                                   (1) 
 
where s is the constant saving rate, ranging from 0 to 1, k is the capital stock per person, Aƒ(k) is 
the production function in per capita terms, δ is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and n is the 
exogenous rate of the population growth. Thus δ + n is the depreciation curve, a horizontal line, and 
s*Aƒ(k)/k is the savings curve, a downward-sloping line. The basic idea of convergence is that, 
given the diminishing returns to capital, each addition to the capital stocks generates higher returns 
when the capital stock is small. Of course, the capital stock determines per capita Gdp or income, 
via productivity. Thus output and income should grow faster in countries or regions with smaller 
capital, i.e. with smaller income.
1 Under the hypothesis of a Cobb-Douglas form of the production 
function, following Barro (1991), cross-country growth regressions may be expressed as 
 
                                                 
1 In order to satisfy this condition, however, the neoclassical model needs of many collateral qualifications, maybe too 
many as Sylos Labini (1995) pointed out: the most important ones are that all economies must have a similar technol-
ogy (considered in a broader sense including taxation, property rights and other institutional factors) as well as similar 
saving and population growth rates. Although these qualifications are less improbable in interregional comparisons 
within a national state – where exogenous factors are more likely to be common – neoclassical models have been used 
more frequently to test convergence across national states, due to the availability of data and maybe to the major rele-
vance of the subject.   3 
γi=βlogyi,0 + ψXi + πZi + εi                                                                                                                                              (2) 
 
Where γi is the growth rate of a i country, yi,0 is its initial level of per capita Gdp or value added 
(income), Xi represents other growth determinants suggested by the Solow model a part from the 
initial level of income, while πZi represents those determinants which are not accounted for by the 
Solow model. 
We have unconditional β-convergence when 
 
γi=βlogyi,0 + εi                                                                                                                                                                           (3) 
 
with the negative sign of the coefficient β.  
Otherwise we do not have unconditional convergence. We can still have conditional conver-
gence, however, if after adding other variables to (3) the β coefficient gets negative (Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991 and 1992). The basic idea behind conditional convergence is that differences in per 
capita incomes are not permanent only because of cross-country (or cross regional) structural het-
erogeneity: that is, because the model does not satisfy collateral qualifications. This can be due to 
different resource endowments, institutions, migration rates as well as to human and social capital 
disparities, among the others. In the growth regressions each one of these factors can be a ‘condi-
tioning’ variable, coming either from within the Solow model variable group Xi (i.e. human capital, 
institutions or social capital, if we consider technology in its broadest sense) or from outside the So-
low model, from the Zi variable group (think of climate, but usually variables of this kind are much 
less common in the literature while spanning through an impressive range of categories). Once we 
have checked for the effects of structural heterogeneity, there can still be convergence, yet not con-
vergence to a single common steady state, but convergence of every country (or region) to its own 
steady state, given its own conditioning variables: that is conditional convergence. It has been 
called convergence, but truly this model does not measure convergence across regions or countries, 
since different regions or countries may have different steady states.
2  
                                                 
2 A major problem is the multiplicity of possible regressors: conditioning variables which can be run are practically 
countless. By 2005, Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (Durlauf et al., 2005) classified about 150 independent variables used 
in growth regressions (in almost 300 articles), plus about one hundred instrumental variables. In short, the number of 
possible regressors exceeds the number of cases, thus ‘rendering the all-inclusive regression computationally impossi-
ble’ (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004, p. 814): this is true even in cross-country comparisons, not to mention cross-regional 
ones where the number of cases is usually reduced. One reason of the multiplicity problem may lie in the analytical and 
theoretical weakness of the Cobb-Douglas function, which as mentioned is valid only in the presence of a vast number 
of assumptions, and in the end is not empirically founded (Sylos Labini, 1995, pp. 264-5; Pasinetti, 2000; but also Ro-  4 
There remains the hypothesis that countries do not converge because initial conditions are such 
as to determine long run different outcomes. That is the hypothesis that there are not decreasing re-
turns to capital, for example because the production function has not a Cobb-Douglas form. A sim-
ple linear technology AK, instead of the neoclassical technology Aƒ(k), would transform equation 
(1) in 
 
γk = s*A – (δ + n)                                                                                                             (4) 
  
Where the savings curve is no longer downward sloping but a horizontal line, just like the de-
preciation curve. Thus two economies with different initial capital stock would not converge even 
all other conditions being equal. If technology or other parameters differ as well, these economies 
could still converge, but indeed they could also further diverge: they would converge if A, or s are 
systematically higher in the poorer economy, or if the depreciation line is systematically lower, or if 
other determinants of growth not included in the model are systematically higher as well; but, to 
quote Sala-i-Martin, ‘there is no a priori reason why this should be the case’ (1996, p. 1344). On the 
contrary, there is some evidence that the saving curve is not even horizontal, yet indeed upward 
sloping: for example because of economies of scale, which entail increasing returns to capital and 
have frequently been called into question to explain the rise of the US during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, or the rise of China in the last decades (see Crafts and Venables, 2001). 
With the hypothesis of increasing returns to capital we enter the field of ‘cumulative’ ap-
proaches, which claim with Myrdal (1957) that growth is a spatially cumulative process, which re-
quires a minimum threshold of resources in order to start and which is thus bound to increase re-
gional disparities. These models can more easily explain the existence of ‘convergence clubs’ (Ga-
lor, 1996), countries with similar capital or income levels which exhibit similar long run outcomes. 
There are different schools which refer to the cumulative approaches, among which the most inter-
esting to us are probably the endogenous growth models (Romer, 1986), which link economic 
growth to the levels of human capital (with a possible extension to social capital as well), and the 
new economic geography (Krugman, 1991a), where the key determinants are the economies of ag-
glomeration or the costs of congestion, and thus the size of the market would play a central role.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
mer, 1987; Solow, 2000), thus helping ‘creative theorizing’. One way to cope with the multiplicity problem is to make 
profit of information from qualitative and case-study research, the alternative is to resort to econometrics in order to 
‘automatically’ sort out the irrelevant regressors – as with the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) pro-
posed by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). At the moment, results from BACE models 
are not entirely convincing (cfr. ibid., p. 829); furthermore, in historical analyses the lack of data ultimately frustrates 
the use of BACE techniques.    5 
The new economic geography can radically diverge from the neoclassical approach but, so far, 
theoretical and empirical studies have not been able to resolve the debate. Indeed, in the last years 
apparently some tendency has emerged to reconcile the two strands, yet at the cost of some confu-
sion. In short, it is not easy to distinguish the increasing returns from the other source of divergence, 
i.e. the lack of collateral conditions of the neoclassical models: when there is not convergence, it 
may be difficult to conclude that the neoclassical model can still be valid yet with some qualifica-
tions to be satisfied, or that, on the contrary, cumulative (static) models should be regarded as more 
effective – all the more in historical analyses, where crucial data, such as estimates of capital, are 
often lacking or unreliable. Furthermore, the models of increasing returns can easily be extended to 
predict convergence as well, for example on equation (4) by endogeneizing the saving rate on the 
assumption that it would be decreasing with higher levels of capital (see Uzawa, 1968 and Sala-i-
Martin, 1996): this is not an implausible hypothesis in macroeconomic terms, think of the opposite 
cases of China and the US today. Thus, an unified long term production function based on increas-
ing returns could still be valid also in the case of convergence.
3  
The search for convergence within national states, across regions, should be simplified by the 
fact that here structural heterogeneity plays a minor role, given the usually common macroeconomic 
and institutional context. Yet this does not mean that convergence is the rule. For example, as Pol-
lard pointed out (1981), from the second half of the nineteenth century industrialization and eco-
nomic development spread across Europe disregarding national boundaries, a process responsible of 
a probable increase in regional disparities at least within the main late comers (Italy, Austria-
Hungary, maybe others). Analyses for the European regions in the nineteenth century, however, are 
seriously hampered by the lack or the scarce reliability of historical regional estimates.
4  
                                                 
3 On the other hand, some conditioning variables, such as the stocks of human or of social capital, can be seen alterna-
tively as initial conditions in the endogenous growth models: for example, by decomposing K into physical and human 
capital (see Mankiw et al., 1992). In growth econometrics, endogeneity is usually tested by way of instrumental vari-
ables, which should check for the conditioning variables (that is structural heterogeneity) not being in turn correlated 
with initial conditions. However, to find proper instrumental variables may be a daunting task, especially at a regional 
(sub-national) level and for more distant historical periods. 
4 More accurate regional estimates are in progress for many countries: a research team coordinated by Joan R. Rosés 
and Nikolaus Wolf and funded by the European Science Foundation – ESF is at work in order to produce regional Gdp 
estimates for the European regions at Nuts II, in benchmark years approximately from the end of the nineteenth century. 
For the UK, see Crafts (2004). It is worth noticing that the historical estimates for Italy’s regions used in this paper fol-
low similar methods and assumptions, and rely upon a highly detailed sectoral breakdown (see the next paragraph). 
Concerning the period after world war II, the literature is much richer, with no surprise: see among the others Leonardi 
(1995), Sala-i-Martin (1996), Petrakos et al. (2005).   6 
The situation is better for the United States: here evidence indicates divergence between the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, as industrialization increased in the North-East and spread 
mainly to the northern and central regions, whereas in the second half of the twentieth century the 
southern and western states industrialized as well and so converged (Kim, 1998). Jeffrey William-
son in a pioneering work (1965) had already depicted a double movement, of divergence and then 
convergence, and thus he had proposed to extend the Kuznets’ inverted U-shaped function to the re-
lationship between income and regional disparities (rising in the first phase, then decreasing).
5 In-
deed, both neoclassical and cumulative theories can be reconciled with this model, and in fact both 
have been called upon to explain the pattern of regional disparities in the US during the last dec-
ades.
6 Williamson himself argued that convergence could occur because of either increasing inte-
gration (neoclassical) or economies/diseconomies of agglomeration (cumulative). 
Although the shift from divergence to convergence is often considered and widely accepted, 
economic literature has mostly neglected the possibility of a further reversal of fortune: i.e. that 
convergence is again followed by divergence. A recent paper by Robert Lucas may be taken as 
paradigmatic: the basic idea behind Lucas’ model is that soon or later, although at different times 
(no matter for which reason), a region or a country will start industrial development and then con-
verge. The problem is only to establish when, not even if. However, once a region has embarked 
upon economic growth, the process of convergence (on the long run) can not be reversed (Lucas, 
2000). 
As we are going to illustrate, Italy’s figures show as over the long run the story can be more 
complicated than what neoclassical and also the ‘reconciling’ approaches predict. Divergence may 
be followed by convergence, and then again by divergence. To properly account for these changes, 
perhaps we should consider different production functions according to the different historical peri-
ods, that is we should move from a static to a truly dynamic long term approach. But this would re-







                                                 
5 As known, Kuznets built this model in order to account for the pattern of household income inequality (Kuznets, 
1955). 
6 See Kim (1998) for the neoclassical explanation, Krugman (1991b) and Krugman and Venables (1995) for the cumu-
lative one.   7 
3. The overall picture: Italian regional disparities in the long run 
 
Table 1 presents regional per capita value added from 1891 to 2001, in benchmark years. Direct 
accounting estimates are available only from the 1970s onwards, whereas the estimates for the pre-
vious years (1891, 1911, 1938 and 1951) have been calculated from a number of different sources, 
mainly the reconstruction of national value added edited by Guido Maria Rey (1992; 2000) and re-
gional employment and wage data.
7  
 
Table 1. Per capita value added in Italy’s regions, 1891-2001 (Italy=1)  
  1891 1911 1938 1951 1971 1981 2001
Piedmont 1.47 1.21 1.14 1.15
Aosta Valley 
1.08 1.15 1.39
1.58 1.35 1.30 1.24
Liguria 1.44  1.54  1.68 1.62 1.16 1.11 1.09
Lombardy 1.15  1.19  1.39 1.53 1.34 1.28 1.30
North-west 1.16  1.22  1.43 1.52 1.28 1.22 1.24
Trentino-Alto A.  -  -  0.95 1.06 1.01 1.12 1.29
Veneto 0.80  0.86  0.84 0.98 0.99 1.08 1.13
Friuli -  -  1.19 1.11 1.00 1.09 1.12
Emilia 1.06  1.08  1.04 1.12 1.14 1.29 1.23
Tuscany   1.03  0.97  1.01 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.09
The Marches  0.88  0.81  0.79 0.86 0.91 1.05 0.99
Umbria 1.02  0.92  0.96 0.90 0.93 0.98 0.96
Latium 1.57  1.49  1.19 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.13
Center/north-east 1.01  1.00  0.99 1.04 1.04 1.11 1.13
Abruzzi 0.66  0.68  0.58 0.58 0.80 0.84 0.84
Campania 0.97  0.94  0.82 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.65
Apulia 1.02  0.85  0.72 0.65 0.75 0.72 0.67
Lucania 0.74  0.73  0.57 0.47 0.75 0.68 0.73
Calabria 0.67  0.70  0.49 0.47 0.67 0.65 0.64
Sicily 0.93  0.85  0.72 0.58 0.70 0.71 0.66
Sardinia 0.94  0.92  0.83 0.63 0.85 0.72 0.76
South and islands  0.88  0.84  0.70 0.61 0.73 0.70 0.68
Italy (2001 euros)  1,313  2,064  2,596 2,940 10,027 13,199 19,928
Yearly growth rate 
(%) -  2.29  0.85 0.96 6.33 2.79 2.08
Notes: based on the borders of the time and on current population. 2001 constant prices 
are obtained via deflating benchmark current prices from the official (Istat) index of con-
sumer prices.  
Source: Felice, 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
7 For 1938 and 1951, see Felice (2005a); for 1891 and 1911, see Felice (2005b) and then Felice (2009) which for many 
industrial sectors incorporates published and unpublished estimates by Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea (e.g. 2009). In Felice, 
agricultural value added at the regional level is derived from the gross saleable production, as estimated by Federico 
(2003a).   8 
Not remarkable at the beginning, North-South differences increased over the 1891-1951 period, 
although at different rates. During the 1891-1911 years – roughly the first globalization period – di-
vergence was slow, whereas from 1911 to 1951 – during the two world wars, the fascist dictatorship 
and the reconstruction after world war II – Southern Italy fell back remarkably. Conversely, the 
1951-1971 economic ‘miracle’ saw convergence of the South, at quite a speedy rate. But this came 
to a halt during the 1970s, the decade of the stagflation crisis, and the Mezzogiorno slightly fell 
back also in the last two decades of the twentieth century.  
These trends are confirmed by the indices of regional disparities (table 2), which are based on 













⎝⎠ ∑                                                                                                      (6) 
 
where y is per capita Gdp,  p stays for population and i and m refer to the i-region and to the na-
tional total respectively (Williamson, 1965). 
On the whole, regional disparities in Italy increased up to 1951, then decreased during the 1950s 
and 1960s; but in the last thirty years they slightly increased again. It is worth noticing that there 
was convergence within the three macro-areas, which thus should be regarded as an ex-post con-
struct, at least in terms of per capita value added: they took shape in the inter-war years, well after 
Unification. In short, convergence interested the North-West and the Nec regions and, to a relevant 
degree, the regional economies within all the three macro-areas (North-West, Nec and Southern It-
aly). The problem is that on the whole the Southern regions, the poorest ones, kept on falling behind 
the Italian average over most of the 1891-2001 period, with the exception of the 1951-1971 years.  
 
Table 2. Indices of regional inequality, 1891-2001 
 1891 1911  1938 1951 1971 1981 2001 
Italy 0.194 0.208  0.302 0.362 0.226 0.231 0.250 
North-west 0.094 0.101  0.070 0.031 0.057 0.061 0.067 
Center/north-east 0.214 0.193  0.126 0.074 0.063 0.081 0.067 
South and islands  0.149 0.108  0.156 0.118 0.066 0.066 0.082 
Notes and source: see the text. 
 
Williamson’s formula has a rationale similar to the variance or the standard deviation, and thus 
it can be taken as a measure of sigma convergence (the decrease of dispersion), quite efficacious 
since it weights deviations with the share of population (small regions have a minor impact). The 
lack of sigma convergence does not invalidate the possibility of beta convergence, i.e. that the most   9 
backward regions grew faster than the most advanced ones: beta convergence is a necessary condi-
tion of sigma convergence, not viceversa, and of course it can be measured by unconditional con-
vergence models.  
Table 3 shows the results of the unconditional convergence regressions, as from equation (3) of 
§ 2, both in cross-sections and in two dynamic panel data (DPD) models. The 1951-1971 years are 
the only period when unconditional convergence took place. It may be noticed that for the 1891-
1911 period the coefficient of the cross-section regression is negative (although insignificant), 
whereas according to the Williamson’s formula (table 2) there was sigma divergence. This latter 
measure is more reliable, since the former does not allow for the different size of each region, its 
relative importance: during the 1891-1911 years some small regions of Southern Italy converged 
and this has had an impact on the regression results. Another problem with growth regressions is 
that the choice of time periods may heavily affect the results. If we had taken the 1951-2001 inter-
val, for example, we would have found convergence, yet ignoring the divergence of the last three 
decades. On the contrary, we would have had divergence if we had considered all the 1891-1971 in-
terval, regardless of the 1951-1971 convergence. If we had split up the twentieth century into two 
halves (1901-1951 and 1951-2001) we would still have found the inverted U-shaped figure pro-
posed by Williamson: but that choice would have omitted an important part of the story.  
 
Table 3. Unconditional convergence of the Italian regions, 1891-2001  
Cross-section linear regressions  Dynamic panel data (DPD), linear regression 




















Constant 0.026  -0.074  -0.061 0.131 -0.016 0.010 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0199
Standard error  0.021  0.035*  0.050 0.008*** 0.066 0.019 0.0122 0.0103 0.0351 0.0010***
B1  -0.001 0.010 0.009 -0.011 0.004 0.001 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 -0.0237
B1 standard error  0.003  0.005**  0.006 0.000*** 0.007 0.002 0.0015 0.0011*  0.0037 0.0443
R
2 0.011  0.264  0.101 0.892 0.022 0.009 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.29(1)
N 16  16  18 19 19 19 107  107  107 104
Dependent variable: Ln value added growth rates by sub-period (t1 – t0). Independent variable: Ln value added in t0. (1) Wald 
Chi2.  
In the GMM DPD, the independent variable is the Ln of value added growth rates by sub-period (t0 – t-1), instrumented using 
Ln value added in t-1; the robust option was preferred because GMM two-step standard errors are biased, indicating hetero-
schedasticity. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: elaborations from table 1. 
 
Neither there was beta convergence over the whole period, as indicated by the results of the 
panels. But we cannot even say that there was divergence: in the fixed effects model the positive 
coefficient of the independent variable is insignificant, whereas in the GMM model the coefficient   10  
is negative, but insignificant too. The GMM estimator is more appropriate when the panel is rela-
tively small (in particular with a limited number of years),
8 such as in this case. The fixed effects 
model remains of some interest,
9 because here the cluster option worsens the significance of the co-
efficient: this finding indicates the existence of co-movements in Italy’s regions, according to the 
different historical periods (regional economies performed better when the national economy per-
formed better, and viceversa). A truly dynamic approach, which would highlight the specificity of 
each historical period, seems all the more profitable.  
To sum up, for Italy’s regions the neoclassical model of unconditional convergence is not valid. 
These models neither have a satisfactory descriptive capacity. The weighted index of regional dis-
parities, as from table 2, is more precise in many aspects, and can be integrated with descriptive sta-
tistics in order to properly present the basic facts, as we are now going to do. 
Figure 1 shows the Kernel densities of per capita value added: at just one glance, it gives the 
idea of what was going on during the twentieth century. Regional differences increased in the first 
half: the industrial triangle was already apparent by 1911, and the three-fold macro-regional classi-
fication was clearly visible by 1951 (corresponding to the three bell-shaped curves). Between 1951 
and 1971 regional differences considerably reduced, yet in 1981 the situation had changed once 
again: some Italian regions still converged, some others were left behind and practically cut-off 
from the bulk. These latter were the southern regions. Significantly enough, by 2001 the snapshot 
was still approximately the same as by 1981. 
 
Figure 1. Kernel densities of per capita value added in Italy’s regions, 1891-2001 
 
Legend: x is the logarithm of per capita value added (2001 euros) in benchmark years. 
                                                 
8 See Blundell and Boll, 1998. 
9 For a review of this approach, see Islam, 1995.   11  
 
Figure 2. Regional and macroregional trends of per capita value added in the long run (1891-2001) 
 
Source and legend: see table 1.  
Note: 1901, 1921, 1931, 1941, and 1961 benchmarks are linearly interpolated; the 1938 benchmark is omitted, but it has 
been used to create 1921, 1931, and 1941 interpolations. 
 
Figure 2 is more straightforward, but also eloquent. It displays the process of (un-weighted) 
sigma convergence within the three macro-areas, as well as the lack of it for Italy’s regions over the 
long run. We can observe the forging ahead of the North-West in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the convergence of the South and the Center/North-East since the 1950s and which came to a 
halt for the South in the 1970s, while continuing for the Center/North-East. 
In the next two paragraphs, we will explore two variables, human and social capital, which 
could be called upon to explain the pattern of regional inequality in Italy. They are not the only ones 
which could have played a role: among the other determinants, there may be natural resources (Caf-
agna, 1965 and 1989; Fenoaltea, 2006), or the geographical position.
10 Yet the first two have been 
                                                 
10 This was also referred to in order to explain the recent rise of some southern regions, in particular Abruzzi and 
Molise: but see Carboni (1998) for a critique based on the role of social capital. Geographical position could even be-  12  
preferred for three reasons. First, they – the so-called intangible factors of production (D’Antonio, 
Flora, Scarlato, 2002, pp. 24-9; Marini, 2000) – are more linked to the human element (knowledge, 
ethics and value, policy), and thus more rich of implications for a policy maker and maybe more 
challenging for historians and economists. Secondly, they seem more appropriate to account for the 
South’s disappointing performance of the last decades – the big discrepancy over the long run – 
when the characteristics of the economic system were such as natural resources and geographical 
position counted less; it is worth adding that they are also very popular in the neoclassical literature: 
to make an example, the quoted BACE article by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) finds primary school 
enrollment as the most powerful variable, after the mentioned East Asian dummy (from this per-
spective, it could be argued that we somehow allow for the multiplicity of regressors). Lastly, in 
this case estimates for Italy’s regions were available or easy to reconstruct for the same benchmark 
years as with per capita value added, thus making irresistible the temptation of comparing the data.  
 
 
4. On the role of human capital 
 
From Carlo Maria Cipolla (1969), at least, economic historians have regarded human capital, 
usually measured as education, as one of the preconditions for economic growth (Easterlin, 1981; 
Nuñez, 1990), thus paving the way to the formal modelling of the new growth economists (Romer, 
1986; Lucas, 1988; then Ram, 1990 and 1991, who first used conditional convergence). By this re-
gard, Italy can be a profitable field of analysis, due to its remarkable education regional disparities 
at the time of Unification (see Felice, 2007a, pp. 144-50). Estimates of human capital at the regional 
level, in benchmark years, are shown in table 4. It is worth noting that in this case the Italian regions 
converged over the long-run, although the process of convergence was significantly slower in the 
first decades following Unification, due to the faults of the early compulsory education laws.
11 Ad-
mittedly, we are considering a composite index, whose criteria are arguably arbitrary:
12 however, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
come favourable to the southernmost regions in the near future, since they are now closer to the soaring Asia (Rossi, 
2005). 
11 Cfr. Vasta (1996, 1999). If we limited to literacy, we would observe indeed (population-weighted) sigma divergence 
from 1871 to 1891; convergence increased significantly only after a more effective law, Daneo-Credaro, was issued in 
1911 (Felice, 2007b). 
12 The index is made up of literacy and either enrolment rate or years of schooling, with variable weights according to 
the different historical periods, as from Felice (2007a and 2007b). Literacy is given a share of 3/3 in 1871, 2/3 in 1891 
and 1911, 55% in 1938, 50% in 1951; since then, every ten years it is reduced by 5 percentage points, so that by 2001 it   13  
the single components of the index (literacy, enrolment, per capita years of education) have been 
tested in a previous article (Felice, 2008), and neither the results of cross-section linear regressions 
(panel models were not tested), neither the broader picture of regional disparities displayed in table 
4, change significantly, and often do not change at all. This suggests that the evidence we are going 
to detail is quite reliable.  
 
Table 4. Regional inequality in human capital, 1871-2001 (Italy=1) 
  1871 1891 1911 1938 1951 1971 1981 2001 
Piedmont 1.145 1.055 1.027  1.005 
Aosta Valley 
1.849 1.662 1.389 1.094
1.106 1.036 1.023 1.007 
Liguria 1.401 1.376  1.322 1.146 1.140 1.098 1.066  1.040 
Lombardy 1.756 1.523  1.357 1.111 1.155 1.072 1.052  1.030 
North-west   1.753 1.559 1.365 1.111 1.149 1.070 1.046 1.024 
Trentino-Alto Ad.  - -  - 1.262 1.154 1.088 1.047  1.021 
Veneto 1.131 1.234  1.222 1.088 1.067 1.029 1.010  1.002 
Friuli - -  - 1.188 1.152 1.083 1.047  1.035 
Emilia 0.901 1.019  1.144 1.041 1.060 1.019 1.015  1.013 
Tuscany   1.022 0.932  1.005 1.057 1.016 1.005 1.002  1.000 
The Marches  0.673 0.727  0.844 0.989 0.983 0.961 0.983  0.996 
Umbria 0.638 0.776  0.864 0.971 0.970 0.970 0.995  1.011 
Latium 1.035 1.088  1.098 1.056 1.066 1.088 1.079  1.072 
Center/north-east 0.968 1.027  1.042 1.069 1.055 1.035 1.027  1.023 
Abruzzi 0.487 0.599  0.733 0.917 0.899 0.925 0.951  0.988 
Campania 0.641 0.712  0.756 0.904 0.861 0.925 0.955  0.968 
Abulia 0.497 0.580  0.691 0.809 0.834 0.904 0.926  0.946 
Lucania 0.385 0.495  0.587 0.758 0.766 0.845 0.891  0.950 
Calabria 0.417 0.449  0.537 0.735 0.731 0.850 0.903  0.953 
Sicily 0.471 0.576  0.709 0.841 0.839 0.901 0.927  0.949 
Sardinia 0.446 0.627  0.719 0.885 0.838 0.921 0.945  0.965 
South and islands  0.510 0.599  0.700 0.846 0.835 0.904 0.934  0.958 
Source: Felice 2007a.  
 
As mentioned, according to the neoclassical approach the contribution of human capital to value 
added convergence may be tested via the model of conditional regression, where human capital is 
the conditioning variable, as from equation (2) in § 2.
13 In table 5, we present the results of condi-
tional convergence tests both in the cross-section and in the dynamic panel data regressions (to con-
trol for endogeneity, human capital has been instrumented using its lag). In order to be correctly un-
derstood, these results must be considered jointly with those of table 3. 
Human capital was significant in particular from 1891 to 1951, when the coefficient of per cap-
ita value added, the other independent variable, has a negative sign and in some periods is even sig-
nificant, unlike in the unconditional convergence model of table 3: thus we have convergence, but 
                                                                                                                                                                  
has fallen to 25%. The remaining share is assigned to the enrolment ratio in 1891, 1911 and 1938, to the per capita years 
of schooling from 1951 onwards, when this indicator is available. 
13 For an overview of the debate about the role of human capital in conditional regressions, see Felice (2008, pp. 59-63).   14  
conditional on human capital.
14 As expected, human capital is insignificant in the 1951-1971 years 
of convergence, when there are no changes in the value added coefficient; it resumes significance in 
the last decades, when convergence has come to a halt, but now it looks much weaker than in the 
pre-1951 years, and the conditional value added coefficient is practically insignificant. In short, 
human capital may have played some role in the pre-1951 years, hardly a one in the second half of 
the twentieth century.
15 This finding begs for a dynamic approach. 
 
Table 5. Conditional convergence of the Italian regions (1891-2001): adding human capital 













Fixed effects  GMM 
Constant  0.059 0.018 0.130 0.131 0.198 0.040 -0.0018 -0.4277
Standard error  0.018***  0.037  0.052** 0.012*** 0.097* 0.022* 0.0125 0.1303***
B1  -0.006 -0.004 -0.032 -0.011 -0.030 -0.006 0.0016 -0.2659
B1 standard error  0.003**  0.005  0.009*** 0.002*** 0.014* 0.004 0.0015 0.1527*
B2  0.006 0.016 0.127 0.000 0.103 0.034 0.0082 0.4587
B2 standard error  0.002***  0.005***  0.026*** 0.006 0.038** 0.016* 0.0069 0.1276***
R
2  0.486 0.631 0.682 0.892 0.329 0.225 0.334 15.28(1)
N  16 16 18 19 19 19 107  104
Dependent variable: Ln value added growth rates by sub-period (t1 – t0). (1) Wald Chi2. 
Independent variables: Ln value added (B1) and human capital (B2) in t0.  
In the GMM DPD, the independent variables are the Ln of value added growth rates by sub-period (t0 – t-1), instrumented us-
ing Ln value added in t-1, and human capital in t1; the robust option was preferred because GMM two-step standard er-
rors are biased, indicating heteroschedasticity. 
In all the regressions human capital is instrumented using  its lag (OLS method). 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: elaborations from tables 1 and 4. 
 
Neoclassical economists use to regard the panel approach as dynamic, but truly it is not. On the 
contrary, it is the most static-inspired one, provided we get out of the framework which makes us 
accept one single long term production function: the panel dynamic approach, in fact, incorporates 
time variation into one single function. If we have some (a-priori?) belief into this long term pro-
duction function, then of course the panel approach may be considered dynamic, merely in the 
                                                 
14 For a confirm of the positive role of education in the North-Western take-off during the liberal age (1861-1913), and 
thus of its negative role for southern Italy in the same period, see Zamagni (1978a). 
15 Zamagni (1993) found a positive role of human capital in the 1951-1987 years, but the different results may be ex-
plained by the choice of a larger time interval. For the 1963-1994 years, see also Di Liberto (2001), where the scarce 
role of human capital for the most advanced regions is confirmed, but also its (negative) importance for the most back-
ward ones.   15  
sense that it allows for changes in the observations over time.
16 It is only after this premise that we 
can properly discuss the somehow puzzling results of the dynamic panel: according to the fixed ef-
fect model, human capital is irrelevant; conversely, according to the GMM model human capital is 
relevant and the conditional convergence approach would work. We can regard the GMM estimator 
as more reliable, for the reasons exposed in the previous paragraph, but we must point out that the 
discrepancy between the two models seriously undermines the reliability of both. The lack of reli-
ability may be due to misspecification, yet an alternative explanation should also be considered: a 
‘dynamic’ approach based on one single production function is not the right way to explore growth 
in the long run, i.e. it is not a satisfactory solution to account for parameter changes over time. 
Paradoxically, but no so surprisingly after what we said, the cross-section linear regressions seem 
more useful to this scope: human capital may have been relevant in some periods – roughly in the 
first half – not in others.  
Unless we do not empirically verify the Cobb-Douglas function, of course over the long run, 
what all these models – both cross section and panel – indicate is a simple correlation.
17 They add 
few more, or maybe nothing, to what descriptive statistics may tell. For example, a mere sequence 
of scatter/dot graphs, as from figure 3, can be as much eloquent. In the figure, the slope of the fit 
line and the value of R
2 increased until 1951, indicating a growing correlation between per capita 
value added and human capital, whereas they decreased in the following two decades and remained 
approximately unchanged from 1971 to 2001. Over the long run, the movement of the fit line from 
right to left (lower in 1891, higher in 2001) shows that regional differences in human capital be-
came progressively less relevant than those in per capita value added. Furthermore, figure 3 illus-
trates as the formation of the three macro-areas (North-West, Center/North-East and the Mezzog-
iorno) took place in both per capita value added and human capital. Around 1891, in fact, many 
central regions were closer to the South than to the North-West, whereas by 1951 the three macro-
areas had become clearly visible. In the following three decades, the macro-areas became two, the 
Center/North-East catching-up with the North-West, while the South (with the exception of the 
Abruzzi) was falling behind. Finally, figure 3 shows also which regions scored a level of per capita 
value added higher than their level of human capital, as compared to the Italian average (those 
above the fit line), and which on the contrary had a lower level of value added, given their rank in 
                                                 
16 It must be recognized that economists have usually employed panel data for relatively short periods, usually not ex-
ceeding four decades, although this was due mainly to data constraints: cfr. the sentence by Durlauf et al., “Now that 
more recent data are available, there is more scope for estimating panels with a longer time dimension” (2005, p. 628). 
17 Needless to say, between 1891 and 1951 there were other factors at stake, such as natural resources, geographical po-
sition, the very forces of agglomeration and increasing returns of the cumulative approaches which may have involved 
physical capital (Rossi and Toniolo, 1994), as well as social capital (see the next paragraph).   16  
human capital (those below the fit line); and how these ranks changed over more than a century. 
Veneto, for example, passed from the second group (until 1971) to the first one (in the last three 
decades): at the end of the nineteenth century it was a poor region with a relatively high level of 
human capital; by the end of the twentieth century, a rich region with relatively low education. 
Latium followed the opposite path, changing position from 1911 to 1951.  
This mere evidence begs for further investigation on how human capital affected the growth of 
each and every region, and on how and why the correlation between human capital and economic 
growth changed over time. These should be important questions for growth economists and eco-
nomic historians – from which a profitable comparative analysis could follow – but at the moment a 
neoclassical convergence model seems inadequate to answer them.   17  
Figure 3. Per capita value added and human capital in Italy’s regions, 1891-2001 
 
Note: per capita value added in Ln 2001 euros (y-axis), human capital on Italy=1 (x-axis). Elaborations from tables 1 and 4.   
   18  
 
5. The search for social capital 
 
Social capital is an elusive concept, since it was introduced and gained momentum between the 
end of the 1970s and the 1980s (Coleman, 1988),
18 probably more elusive and problematic than 
human capital. The well-known definition by Putnam (1993, p. 167), which was proposed with re-
spect to the Italian regions,
19 refers to it as ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society’: it is a combination of formal and informal 
rules, which involves somehow also institutional performance, another recently successful explana-
tory variable of long term economic performance (see Acemoglu et al., 2005).  
For our purposes, we can avail of a recent work by Giorgio Nuzzo (2006), who adopts a defini-
tion similar to that of Putnam and offers a reconstruction of social capital for the Italian regions 
from 1901 to 2001, in benchmark years. Nuzzo’s index is a simple mean of social participation, po-
litical participation and trust: the first is measured by the average of the densities of different no 
profit institutions; political participation is measured by the average of the densities of political no 
profit institutions, of the shares of voters out of total population at different elections, and of an in-
formal indicator based on polls drawn from 1993 to 2003 about political engagement; trust is meas-
ured by the inverse of an average of estimates of violent criminality, of court proceedings, as well 
as of the share of perceived criminality as resulting from polls conducted in 1995 and 2003. To my 
knowledge, up to now this is the only work which gives a century-long view of social capital for the 
Italian regions through a coherent methodology, although still many qualifications could be made to 
the estimates. In order to render them comparable with the figures on value added and human capi-
tal, I have reconstructed two more benchmarks, 1871 and 1891, through a methodology which di-
rectly associates my results to the Nuzzo’s ones.
20 The estimates of social capital for Italys’ regions 
are shown in table 6. 
                                                 
18 For an overview of the studies with reference to economic growth, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005). 
19 See also Helliwell and Putnam (1995); see Felice (2007a, pp. 54-64), for some elaborations on institutions and social 
capital from Putnam data. 
20 More precisely, social participation is estimated via the total members of friendly societies, as a ratio of population: 
first, data for 1904, 1895 and 1873 have been used to create 1871, 1891 and 1901 benchmarks, via linear interpolation 
with the continuous compounding yearly rate; secondly, for 1901 the linear correlation between the number of members 
and the Nuzzo’s index of social participation (the dependent variable) has been tested, resulting very high (R
2 0.706, F 
33.671 and significant at the 0.001 level, beta coefficient of the number of members 0.892 and significant at the 0.001 
level); thirdly, 1891 figures have been estimated by maintaining for every region the 1901 ratio social participation / 
number of members, then re-proportioning figures with the regional population; lastly, this procedure has been repeated   19  
 
Table 6. Regional inequality in social capital, 1871-2001 (Italy=1) 
  1871 1891 1911 1938 1951 1971 1981 2001 
Piedmont  1.163 1.405 1.451 1.229 1.210 1.098 1.128 1.048 
Aosta Valley  - - - - 1.668 1.763 1.514  1.493 
Liguria  1.337 1.306 1.189 1.091 1.040 1.022 1.091 1.050 
Lombardy  1.313 1.449 1.364 1.196 1.179 1.087 1.067 1.096 
North-west   1.255 1.414 1.373 1.195 1.174 1.087 1.091 1.081 
Trentino-Alto Ad.  - - - 4.519 3.979 3.626 3.134  2.057 
Veneto  0.725 0.971 1.113 1.055 1.055 1.128 1.257 1.255 
Friuli  - - - 1.285 1.288 1.384 1.552  1.349 
Emilia  1.239 1.120 1.231 1.131 1.206 1.093 1.297 1.272 
Tuscany   1.669 1.437 1.359 1.309 1.334 1.169 1.303 1.247 
The Marches  0.626 0.687 0.834 0.997 1.125 1.051 1.205 1.239 
Umbria  1.292 1.166 1.198 1.115 1.112 1.125 1.331 1.366 
Latium  1.627 1.306 0.919 0.798 0.812 0.867 0.796 0.804 
Center/north-east  1.169 1.130 1.152 1.228 1.231 1.181 1.260 1.193 
Abruzzi  0.417 0.621 0.629 0.665 0.661 0.726 0.887 1.131 
Campania  0.560 0.476 0.505 0.514 0.542 0.659 0.374 0.430 
Apulia  0.846 0.734 0.586 0.650 0.682 0.711 0.548 0.748 
Lucania  0.454 0.596 0.697 0.573 0.557 0.789 0.785 0.830 
Calabria  0.421 0.351 0.483 0.548 0.541 0.738 0.817 0.654 
Sicily  0.982 0.741 0.722 0.680 0.669 0.806 0.733 0.823 
Sardinia  0.695 0.669 0.510 0.632 0.799 0.914 1.045 1.095 
South and islands  0.673 0.605 0.596 0.613 0.630 0.743 0.646 0.728 
Source: elaborations from Nuzzo (2006). For 1871 and 1891, see the text. 1938 figures are linearly inter-
polated between 1921 and 1951 with the continuous compounding yearly rate. 
 
It is worth noticing that, unlike human capital, and much like per capita value added, in this 
case there was not convergence between the southern regions and the rest of the country, over the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for 1871, using the 1891 new estimate of social participation; the number of friendly societies and the total amount of 
deposits of the banche popolari have been tested too, alone or in combination (also with the number of members), but 
resulted uncorrelated with Nuzzo’s figures. Political participation is estimated via the number of political journal and 
newspapers published in 1880, 1891, 1895 and 1905, which, as a ratio of population, have been used to create 1871, 
1891 and 1901 benchmarks (for 1901, my benchmark is weakly correlated with the Nuzzo’s index of political participa-
tion, the dependent variable: R
2 0.327, F 6.311 and significant at the 0.05 level, beta coefficient of the number of politi-
cal newspapers 0.219 and significant at the 0.05 level; excluding Sardinia which was an outlier in Nuzzo’s figures); the 
estimating procedure is analogous to that used for social participation, and of course in this case data have been re-
proportioned over the Nuzzo’s index of political participation. Trust is approximated through the inverse of an average 
of criminal and civil court proceedings in 1901-04, 1891 and (only criminal) 1871 (for 1901, my benchmark was highly 
correlated with the Nuzzo’s index of trust: R
2 0.819, F 58.757 and significant at the 0.001 level, beta coefficient of our 
indicator 0.845 and significant at the 0.001 level; excluding the Marches which was an outlier in Nuzzo’s figures); the 
estimation procedure is analogous to that used for the other two dimensions, in this case the data being correlated with 
the Nuzzo’s index of trust; since for 1871 only criminal statistics were available, these were in turn correlated with 
criminal statistics in 1891. All data are from Ministero di agricoltura, industria e commercio (1878; 1881; 1893; 1900; 
1908). 
   20  
long run. Southern Italy was considerably behind the Centre-North in the second half of the nine-
teenth century – after all it was the homeland of what Banfield (1958) had named ‘amoral fa-
milism’ – and on the whole differences remained high throughout the twentieth century: they 
slightly reduced between 1951 and 1971, but later increased again.  
The reliability of Nuzzo’s estimates may be questioned, idem for some of the proxies here used 
to extend the benchmarks,
21 yet both the conventional wisdom and the well-known Putnam’s essay 
with Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) support the idea that disparities in social capital are entrenched 
into the Italian history. According to Putnam, they date since the Middle Ages. According to Ta-
bellini (2005), sharp institutional regional differences between North and South (correlated with 
social capital, as from Putnam) were already present in the seventeenth century. The works by 
Brian A’Hearn (1998 and 2000) share the view that social capital was lower in the South during 
the liberal age, and that this affected economic performance. For what concerns the persistence of 
social capital disparities, Nuzzo takes indeed an optimistic hold, since he argues that regional lev-
els did change through time, with some improvement in the South during the second half of the 
twentieth century: yet this is true only for some smaller Southern regions, Sardinia and Abruzzi in 
particular, maybe for Lucania or for the Marches in the Nec, not for the Mezzogiorno as a whole. 
Concerning the last decades, Putnam’s estimates of regional civicness show higher regional dis-
parities then Nuzzo (Putnam 1993), and the same can be said for other measures of social capital 
referring to recent years, such as those by Cartocci (2007).  
In the first instance, the correlations of human capital and of social capital with per capita value 
added can be compared by replicating the exercise made with human capital (table 5) for social 
capital (table 7). In the same growth regressions, social capital seems to perform worse, in particu-
lar in the 1891-1911 years. For the other periods, the results are very similar. On the whole, social 
capital does not seem to be relevant in the dynamic panel models (whose results are again contra-
dictory), unlike human capital. From this evidence, it should be concluded that human capital was 
                                                 
21 Arguably the most problematic is the proxy for political participation (political journals and newspapers), which 
maybe not by chance is the less correlated with Nuzzo’s figures. Although the distribution of political newspapers 
broadly reflects the well-known regional differences in political participation we can observe today (half of the about 
800 political journal and newspapers were published in Emilia, Tuscany and the North-West), further research is needed 
in order to verify and integrate the extant measure with more information. For example, for political journal and news-
papers we don’t even know how many copies were printed. It must be added that in this case good proxies are hard to 
find, mostly because of the absence of universal suffrage in liberal Italy; alternative sources such as the distribution of 
public libraries can be useful, but their combination with more traditional proxies of political participation is far from 
obvious. However, we do not think that possible refinements would alter the overall picture (lower social capital in the 
South during the liberal age), indeed they would probably reinforce it.   21  
more important, although this would be at odds with most of the literature available on the falling 
back of Southern Italy in the last decades.
22   
 
Table 7. Conditional convergence of the Italian regions (1891-2001): adding social capital 













Fixed effects  GMM 
Constant  0.027 0.021 0.070 0.131 0.027 0.029 0.0025 -0.0328
Standard error  0.036  0.040  0.056 0.008*** 0.069 0.018 0.0102 0.0621
B1  -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.0017 -0.0611
B1 standard error  0.005  0.006  0.008 0.001*** 0.008 0.002 0.0011 0.1223
B2  1.61E-005 0.014 0.035 5.66E-005 0.004 0.002 0.0031 0.0483
B2 standard error  0.004  0.004***  0.010*** 0.001 0.003 0.001** 0.0018* 0.0635
R
2  0.011 0.593 0.529 0.892 0.162 0.295 0.039 0.58(1)
N  16 16 18 19 19 19 107  104
Dependent variable: Ln value added growth rates by sub-period (t1 – t0). (1) Wald Chi2. 
Independent variables: Ln value added (B1) and social capital (B2) in t0.  
In the GMM DPD, the independent variables are the Ln of value added growth rates by sub-period (t0 – t-1), instrumented us-
ing Ln value added in t-1, and social capital in t1; the robust option was preferred because GMM two-step standard errors 
are biased, indicating heteroschedasticity. 
In all the regressions social capital is instrumented using  its lag (OLS method). 
* Significant at the 0.1 level. ** Significant at the 0.05 level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: elaborations from tables 1 and 6. 
 
Of course, social capital could be just a redundant variable after human capital (or after 
something else), and viceversa. This possibility can be investigated by running together human 
and social capital in the growth regressions. The results suggest that social capital was the redun-
dant variable for all the 1891-1951 period. But in the last two decades the redundant variable is 
human capital. In short, we have a first and longer phase (1891-1951) when human capital was 
more correlated with value added growth, followed by a second one (1951-1971) when both hu-
man and social capital are uncorrelated with economic growth, and a final phase (the last dec-
ades) when is social capital more correlated. From these premises, unsurprisingly the results of 
the dynamic panel are inconclusive. Cautiousness is warranted in all the regression models, be-
cause the independent variables are highly correlated and thus the results very sensitive to small 
changes in the observations. And because, needless to say, historical (and present) estimates for 
such an elusive concept as social capital are not above criticism. 
 
 
                                                 
22 From an European perspective, for example, Robert Leonardi (1995 and 2005) regarded social capital, institutional 
performance and organized crime – which are correlated – as the determinants of the South’s falling back.    22  
Table 8. Conditional convergence of the Italian regions: adding human and social capital (1891-
2001) 













Fixed effects  GMM 
Constant  0.041 0.043 0.147 .0131 0.188 0.048 0.0003 -0.4273
Standard error  0.026  0.037  0.050 0.014*** 0.101* 0.020** 0.0110 0.3407
B1  -0.004 -0.007 -0.032 -0.011 -0.028 -0.006 0.0014 -0.2570
B1 standard error  0.004  0.005  0.009*** 0.003*** 0.015* 0.003* 0.0010 0.1658
B2  0.006 0.011 0.097 0.000 0.091 0.026 0.0049 0.4547
B2 standard error  0.002***  0.005*  0.031*** 0.009 0.045* 0.015 0.0049 0.3643
B3  -0.003 0.008 0.017 6.79E-005 0.001 0.002 0.0025 0.0020
B3 standard error  0.003  0.005  0.010 0.001 0.003 0.001** 0.0019 0.0395
R
2  0.522 0.701 0.741 0.892 0.341 0.413 0.043 6.77(1)
N  16 16 18 19 19 19 107  104
Notes and source: see tables 5 and 7. B2 is human capital, B3 social capital. 
 
For sure, one reason to keep on investigating on social capital is that, according to the available 
data, in this case the Italian regions did not converge: unlike human capital, but similarly to per 
capita value added.  
Figure 4 is a sequence of scatter/dot graphs analogous to figure 3, with social capital in place of 
human capital. There are some differences between the two charts. In figure 4 correlation is on the 
whole lower, yet regional gaps in social capital remain higher as compared to those in value added. 
Regional patterns are different too. In figure 4, we never have a three-fold repartition, but a two-
fold one: Center-North and the Mezzogiorno. These two groups were already visible by the early 
twentieth century, when Veneto and Latium ranked in a middle position and the Marches belonged 
to the lower group. In the first half of the century, Latium got closer to the Mezzogiorno, but Ve-
neto and the Marches joined the Center-North, whereas on average the Center/North-East overtook 
the North-West. The primacy of the Center/North-East is an important discrepancy with the trend 
of per capita value added, and probably the ultimate reason why in the interwar years economic 
growth is more correlated with human capital than with social capital. During the second half of 
the twentieth century, other regions left the group of the Mezzogiorno, in particular Abruzzi and 
Sardinia which have reached an intermediate position. By the last two decades, in the group with 
lower social capital only six regions have remained, whose five are also those with the lowest per 
capita value added (the other is Latium).    23  
 
Figure 4. Per capita value added and social capital in Italy’s regions, 1891-2001 
 
Note: per capita value added in Ln 2001 euros (y-axis), social capital on Italy=1 (x-axis). Elaborations from tables 1 and 6. Aosta Valley 
and Trentino-Alto A. have been excluded, being outliers.   24  
 
6. The road ahead 
 
The neoclassical approach to convergence relies upon two basic assumptions, both derived from 
statics mechanics. The first (and usually implicit) one is staticity, i.e. the idea that economic per-
formance can be accounted for by a single long term production function. The second assumption is 
that this production function has a Cobb-Douglas form, which involves diminishing returns to capi-
tal. Consequently, the basic idea behind all the neoclassical models is that there is a long term equi-
librium, to which countries or regions should converge. Even when some of these models are called 
dynamic, since they incorporate changes in the observations over time, they are still static in their 
basic assumption: they may allow for cycles around the equilibrium point, they may even allow for 
‘progress’, as a sequence of equilibrium points when technology improves (with an upward shift in 
the production function), but they do not consider structural change in the production function. This 
static framework, which still is the pillar of the dominant economic paradigma, has also been ex-
tended to the new economic geography, which explicitly violates the second assumption of the neo-
classical approach, that of diminishing returns to capital, but can be remodelled within the marginal-
ist analysis nonetheless, as we have seen.
23 One of the consequences is that at the present the inter-
national literature on regional convergence is dramatically inconclusive, and does not seem to fit 
with the evidence from Italy’s regions.  
The new economic geography, however, may also lay the groundwork for a truly dynamic ap-
proach which would allow for structural change in the production function, by recognizing for ex-
ample that according to the historical periods the increasing returns can be followed by decreasing 
returns, then again by increasing ones (thus with rising divergence followed by convergence, and 
then again by divergence). Structural change is what often occurs with economic and technological 
progress over the long run, thus it should be preferred (or at least properly considered) at least in 
historical analyses. 
Given their assumption of staticity, cross-section and panel data regressions have become the 
most popular methods in mainstream growth econometrics, and thus they have been employed also 
in this paper. These methods may still retain some utility, on the strict condition that they are con-
sidered as a first approximation, their implications reviewed as general indications: usually high-
lighting no more than a simple correlation, unless the validity of the Cobb-Douglas function over 
the long run can be verified. In this article, the results from these models suggest the presence of 
some structural change in the production function, as well as in the role of the different (possible) 
                                                 
23 Similarly to what happened with Keynesian economics (e.g. Sylos Labini, 1993, pp. 52-7; Roncaglia, 1999, pp. 24-30 
and 63-8).   25  
conditioning variables. Whereas estimates at the provincial level (i.e. an increase in the number of 
cases) would allow us to test for stronger correlations, a data envelopment analysis (DEA) based on 
estimates of labour and physical capital and thus of total factor productivity, possibly incorporating 
as well human capital (see Henderson and Russell, 2005), would allow us to relax the assumptions 
about the production function.
24  
The alternative (or complementary) line of investigation should go towards a dynamic approach 
based on time-series. This will involve some time and a lot of work in order to be properly imple-
mented, but is not at all out of reach. For what concerns Italy’s regions, we are now going to briefly 
review some steps and opportunities along this path. 
First, it must be stressed that a time series approach would have more chances to properly ad-
dress and understand transformation (a qualitative change) over the long run. Mainstream econo-
mists recognize that ‘at first glance, the most natural way to understand growth would be to exam-
ine time series data’ (Durlauf et al., 2005, p. 624). However, according to Durlauf, Johnson and 
Temple there are two problems with the time series approach. The first one is that ‘the hypotheses 
of most interest to growth theorists are mainly about the evolution of potential output, not devia-
tions from potential output such as business cycles and output collapse’ (ibid., p. 625). This state-
ment arises form the very idea of a long term production function, whose shape would determine 
not only ‘potential output’, such a vague concept already, but its ‘evolution’ over time – neoclassi-
cal economics has been stigmatized as the physics of the society, but here it may look indeed as the 
metaphysics. In turn, this idea is based on the assumption that demand and offer are static curves, 
their intersection determining the point (and the price) of equilibrium. But this was not at all the 
view of classical economists, from Smith to Ricardo: demand and offer are instead flows, which re-
produce and change over time. As convincingly pointed out by Garegnani (e.g. 1959), the differ-
ence is not a nuisance and the two strands are not at all reconcilable. Over the course of the twenti-
eth century, the approach from the classics was revived and improved by the work, among the oth-
ers, of Piero Sraffa (e.g. 1960). In the Sraffa’s model, a new technology leads to the production of a 
new ‘standard commodity’ and to an entirely new price system; and thus technological progress 
may result in significant changes in the shape of the production functions (in the methods of pro-
duction) over time. There are no a-priori reasons to easily dismiss the ‘classical’ dynamic approach, 
on the contrary: at the present, are the mainstream ‘neoclassical’ models which have proved them-
selves inadequate to cope with the problems of underdevelopment, i.e. maybe with the most impor-
tant issues in contemporary economy (Sylos Labini, 2005, p. 183; 2006).
25 If the components of the 
                                                 
24 With reference to the Italian regions, DEA has been successfully applied by Maffezzoli (2006), yet limitedly to the 
1980-2001 years. To be extended back to 1891, DEA would require regional estimates of labour and physical capital. 
25 For an overview with a focus on Southern Italy, see Scarlato (1996) and D’Antonio, Flora, Scarlato (2002).   26  
economic system must be regarded in terms of flows which reproduce themselves every t period, 
thus a time series approach looks as a more appropriate way in order to describe and understand the 
evolution of this system. And the main question would not be about potential output and the equi-
librium, but on the determinants of the flows, the logic and sources of their reproduction and change 
over time, in the short run (with the same technology) and in the long one (when technology 
changes).  
The second problem with the use of time series would be a merely empirical one: the lack of 
data (cfr. Durlauf et al., 2005, p. 625). For most of the developing countries, but also for many ad-
vanced ones, annual time series are not available for periods prior the 1960s (not to speak of 
monthly or seasonal time series); moreover, even when there are time series these are often based 
on interpolation, thus practically of no use for a dynamic approach. Yet this is an apparent problem. 
Rather, it should be regarded as a challenge for further research and in particular for closer collabo-
ration between economic historians, economics statisticians and growth economists. Economic his-
torians all over the world are reconstructing an extensive historical database of Gdp annual series 
from the nineteenth century (GGDC, 2009), although still many gaps have to be filled. If we want to 
make progress in our understanding of the sources of economic growth, it is in this direction that 
our efforts must go, i.e. towards the search for historical and statistical evidence and data and then 
towards the construction of empirically founded models, rather than towards a mere refinement of 
static (and precarious) econometric models often thoughtless of historical evidence.  
By this regard, Italy is one of the countries where most progress has been done in the last dec-
ades, thanks to economic historians. The remarkable work by Stefano Fenoaltea, which took four 
decades to be completed, has yielded an annual series of industrial Gdp for liberal Italy (1861-
1913), divided into hundred of branches (for an overview, see Fenoaltea, 2006). For the same pe-
riod, an annual series of the agricultural production has been estimated by Giovanni Federico 
(2003b), whereas there are on-going researches in order to reconstruct the tertiary sector and to ex-
tend estimates to the 1913-1951 years. For what concerns regional figures, Stefano Fenoaltea and 
Carlo Ciccarelli are reconstructing the annual series of industrial value added for liberal Italy (e.g. 
Ciccarelli and Fenoaltea, 2009), and their results have been incorporated in the present benchmark 
estimates. In the future, this work could be extended to services and agriculture and replicated for 
the interwar period. In short, the goal of having Gdp annual series for Italy’s regions from Unifica-
tion until our days, which would be reasonably reliable and detailed, does not seem unattainable: 
whether and when this goal will be achieved depends mainly on the number, the efforts and the ca-
pacity of those engaged with the task. In the meantime, Vittorio Daniele and Paolo Malanima 
(2007) have produced annual estimates of regional Gdp covering the 1891-1951 years, although   27  
their results should be regarded as very preliminary, since the authors simply extend the bench-
marks by supposing that the national sectoral cycles had the same impact on every region, propor-
tionally to each regional sectoral share (of course, as the authors note, sectoral cycles may also have 
a specific regional component). This is a short-cut, but far better than a simple linear interpolation; 
and often even a time series short-cut is preferable to a cross-section approach, although the cycle 
variation across regions remains to be investigated. It is worth adding that the available statistical 
sources would make possible to produce regional time series also for what concerns human and so-
cial capital, approximately from Unification until our days; maybe also regional series of capital 
and labour. Again, the achievement of this goal is conditional mostly on the efforts devoted to it.  
The consequent dynamic approach could begin by separating the share of Gdp variation refer-
able to per worker productivity, from that referable to the activity rates, as well as by highlighting 
the contributions of the different economic sectors, for example through a shift-share analysis. The 
correlation between human and social capital (or other variables) on the one side, and per worker 
productivity and activity rates on the other should be discussed with different hypotheses according 
to the main historical periods, and later possibly recomposed into an overall picture. It is worth no-
ticing that Daniele and Malanima (2007) have already estimated the different contributions of per 
worker productivity and the activity rates to per capita Gdp, although limitedly to the Centre-North 
and the South: what determined the South’s falling back until 1951 and then its rise in the 1951-
1971 years was per worker productivity, whereas the divergence of the last decade was driven by 
declining activity rates; these results are confirmed by a cross-section analysis at the regional level 
(Felice 2009). Concerning the last decades (1980-2004), when much more data are available, we 
also have an analysis on the determinants of per worker productivity which extends the production 
function by Sylos Labini, and thus investigates and compares different sources of productivity 
gains: in particular the ‘Smith’ effect estimated through per capita income (after checking for en-
dogeneity), the organization effect estimated through the ratio between the cost of labour and the 
average price level, the ‘Ricardo’ effect estimated through the ratio between the cost of labour and 
the cost of machinery, and past and present investments. Results suggest the concurrence of these 
effects, while underlining significant regional differences (Guarini 2007).  
Within a dynamic approach, social capital could be modelled and tested as a determinant of per 
worker productivity, just as it has been done within the neoclassical approach,
26 and as a source of 
lower activity rates (for example, because the illegal economy contributes to keep down the official 
employment figures); human capital too could be modelled and properly tested, probably with bet-
ter results in the case of per worker productivity, as usually recognized. A logical-historical method, 
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such as the one adopted by classic economists which verifies logical hypotheses by the light of his-
torical evidence,
27 could provide the historical backbone for economic analysis.  
This historical framework has been recently outlined and is here briefly resumed. Following 
Fenoaltea (2006, pp. 264-6) and then Felice (forthcoming 2010), a distinction should be made be-
tween fixed and mobile resources: among the former, which are local, we have natural resources in 
the first industrial revolution (approximately 1830–80), human capital in the second one (1880-
1970), social capital in the post-fordist age; mobile resources are mainly technical and financial 
capital, which tends to concentrate where the fixed resources are. The one century and a half from 
Unification until our days should be divided into (at least) four different periods. The first one is the 
liberal age (1861-1913), when in Italy there was a concurrence between the first and the second in-
dustrial revolution and both natural resources (hydraulic power) and human capital were important; 
in the last two-three decades, the growing number of emigrants mostly from the southern regions 
and from Veneto, and more in general international openness, should also be considered as a source 
of possible convergence/divergence. The second period (1914-1951) is characterized by interna-
tional turbulence and rising protectionism, by lower Gdp growth rates, as well as by a further ex-
pansion of the second industrial revolution, with a relative decline of traditional industrial activities 
from the late 1920s: in these decades human capital, R&D activities and more in general endoge-
nous growth may have had an important role in determining regional divergence. The third period 
(1951-1973) is that of the economic miracle, when exports became more and more important and a 
significant interregional migration took place; in these years, a massive regional policy was carried 
out in the South, probably quite effective in temporarily raising per worker productivity via distort-
ing the flows of mobile resources – and thus determining the convergence of the South, its lack of 
fixed resources notwithstanding (Felice, forthcoming 2010). The last decades (1973-2001) are those 
of post-fordism: the Gdp growth rate slowed down, industry declined in comparison to services, re-
gional policies in the South became ineffective if not harmful, but the export-led growth continued 
and was now based on the industrial districts; human capital has become relatively mobile, and so-
cial capital may well result as the key fixed resource, not least because local institutions were 
charged with growing political power. Within this general framework, thanks to a time series ap-
proach some relevant shocks could also be modelled and receive closer attention: such as the 
changes in the tariff policy, the completion of some key infrastructures, or the introduction of a ter-
ritorial wage scale (gabbie salariali) proportional to the cost of living between 1945 and 1954, and 
its abolition between 1969 and 1972 (with consequent higher real wages in the South). Over the 
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long run, the opposite causation, i.e. the effects of economic growth on human capital and above all 





This paper had three main goals: 1) to present the pattern of regional inequality in Italy over the 
long run, in benchmark years, for what regards per capita value added, but also human capital (edu-
cation) and social capital; 2) to discuss the Italian case in the light of the neoclassical convergence 
models, where human capital and social capital may be treated as conditioning variable of a long 
term production function; 3) to highlight the limits of those models and to outline future strands of 
research in order to build a dynamic approach which would consider historical changes in technol-
ogy, in the institutional framework and in the production functions. 
From the onset of industrialization until the 1970s, at a first glance the pattern of regional ine-
quality in Italy appears to be in line with the inverted U-shaped function predicted by the literature 
on regional convergence: rising inequalities in the first stages, until the mid of the twentieth cen-
tury, then convergence. The problem is that in the last three decades most of southern Italy reverted 
its process of catching-up, while the central and northeastern regions accelerated it. As a conse-
quence, over the long run the pattern of regional inequality in Italy looks uneven, with divergence 
followed by convergence and then again by divergence: this may seriously hamper the reliability of 
the convergence models based on a long term production function, even when the role of possible 
conditional variables is considered, as the results from a dynamic panel extended to the whole pe-
riod (1891-2001) indicate. Cross-section regressions for shorter intervals may still retain some util-
ity: they show that the growth of per capita value added was more correlated with human capital in 
the first half of the twentieth century, whereas it was more correlated with social capital in the last 
two decades. These results are precarious because of the high collinearity between the two variables 
and furthermore they denote nothing more than correlation, not causation. Descriptive statistics are 
as much effective in synthesizing the above mentioned evidence. 
More solid knowledge could come from a dynamic approach which would allow for technologi-
cal and institutional change, for example via modelling and running time series regressions instead 
than cross-year ones. With some exceptions, reliable time series for Italy’s regions are not available 
for the period prior to the 1970s, but researchers are at work and hopefully we could avail of a much 
more rich and complete historical dataset in the near future. Meantime, results from benchmark year 
regressions should be regarded as no more than general indications, probably worthy as long as they   30  
highlight topics which deserve further research, in the same way as descriptive statistics. The his-
torical framework and the steps to come for a dynamic time series approach have been sketched out 
in the last paragraph. After all, this approach would go in the direction proposed by Durlauf, John-
son and Temple (Durlauf et al., 2005, pp. 646-7), when discussing the ‘future of growth economet-
rics’: future strands of research should aim to integrate structural growth econometrics, case studies 
and a major attention to the historical and institutional context. It should be added that within the 
neoclassical approach these topics can hardly receive the attention they deserve. 
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